Dear UC Davis Community,
As you know, the task force led by former California Supreme Court Associate Justice Cruz Reynoso has made public its findings and recommendations. The report and all associated background materials have been posted on our website: http://reynosoreport.ucdavis.edu/reynoso-report.pdf
I want to thank Justice Reynoso and each member of the task force for investing such extraordinary effort. I also thank President Yudof for establishing an external review.
I am gratified that the Reynoso report is available to all of us as we continue efforts to make UC Davis a model for tolerance, inclusivity and constructive, spirited dialogue. We all can learn from the difficult events of last November; this report will help us do that.
We will immediately begin to study and assess the report’s recommendations and develop a detailed response and action plan.
I intend to have a preliminary draft of our plan to share with the campus community as quickly as possible. There will be numerous ways for you to comment.
Let me assure you that in doing so, we will ensure that students’ safety and free-speech rights are paramount.
Linda P.B. Katehi
Food will be provided and no, it is not pizza for a change.
Here you can find a PDF (190 pages) of the Reynoso Task Force Report on the Pepper Spray Incident of November 18th last year.
Section I – Deficiencies in the Decision- Making Process and Substantive Mistakes at the Administrative Level
A. There Was a Failure to Investigate Whether or Not “Non- Affiliates” in the UC Davis Occupy Encampment Were present
B. The Administration Decided to Deploy Police to Remove the Tents on Nov. 18 before Considering Other Reasonable Alternatives
C. The Scope of the Police Operation to Remove the Tents Was Ineffectively Communicated, Not Clearly Understood by Key Decision- Makers, and, Accordingly, Could Not Be Adequately Evaluated as to Its Costs and Consequences
D. There Were No Clear Lines Delineating the Responsibility for Decision- Making between Civilian Administrators and Police
E. There Was Confusion as to the Legal Basis for the Police Operation
F. The Leadership Team’s Informal, Consensus- Based Decision- Making Process Was Ineffective for Supporting a Major Extraordinary Event
Section II – The Conduct of the Police Operation
A. The UCDPD Failed to Plan for the Intended Action According to Standard Operating Procedures
B. Notwithstanding the Deficiencies in the Operations Plan, the Incident Was Not Managed According to the Plan
C. The Decision to Use Pepper Spray Was Not Supported by Objective Evidence and Was Not Authorized by Policy
D. The Pepper Spray Used, the MK- 9, First Aerosol Projector, Was Not an Authorized Weapon for Use by the UCDPD
E. There is a Breakdown of Leadership in the UCDPD
F. Other Police Procedural and Tactical Irregularities
Section III – Individual Responsibility
A. The Chancellor Bears Primary Responsibility for the Decision to Deploy the Police at 3 p.m. Rather than During the Night or Early Morning, Which is a Tactical Decision Properly Reserved for Police Authorities
B. The Chancellor Bears Primary Responsibility for the Failure to Communicate Her Position that the Police Operation Should Avoid Physical Force
C. Many Members of the Leadership Team, Including the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor Meyer, and Vice Chancellor Wood, Share Responsibility for the Decision to Remove the Tents on Friday and, as a Result, the Subsequent Police Action Against Protesters
D. Chief Spicuzza Bears Individual Responsibility for Failing to Challenge the Leadership Team’s Decision on the Time of the Police Operation and for Not Clarifying the Role the Police Were Expected to Play During the Operation. She is also Responsible for Numerous Deviations from Best Police Practices Both Before and During the Operation as Detailed in the Kroll Report
E. Officer P [name removed from document upon request] Bears Individual Responsibility for Abdicating his Duties as Incident Commander
F. Lt. Pike Bears Primary Responsibility for the Objectively Unreasonable Decision to Use Pepper Spray on the Students Sitting in a Line and for the Manner in Which the Pepper Spray Was Used
Section IV – Recommendations
A. Recommendations for the Administration and Leadership Response
B. Recommendations for the UC Davis Police
C. Recommendations for System- Wide Consideration
D. Recommendation for the Campus Community